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THE NEW BLACK ON THE DEVELOPMENT CATWALK:  
INCORPORATING RULE OF LAW INTO THE 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS  
 
Per Bergling
†
 & Sophie Jin
†
 
Abstract: As the post-2015 Development Agenda is set to replace the Millennium 
Development Goals (“MDGs”), one of the most controversial new elements of the new 
agenda is the rule of law.  While all of the official fora for discussing and producing 
recommendations have concluded that the rule of law (or some variation) should be 
included, there are still significant challenges to its incorporation in the final Sustainable 
Development Goals (“SDGs”).  The interrelated points of contention have included 
whether rule of law applies at the national government level, whether it encompasses 
domestic governance, and how the concept should be defined and measured.  Going 
forward, there are a few key factors influencing whether and how the rule of law will be 
incorporated into the next round of development goals: 1) the compelling force of 
traditional views on development in determining member states’ positions in the debate; 
2) the continued importance of the United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”) Rule of 
Law Declaration; 3) the centrality of the General Assembly’s Open Working Group on 
Sustainable Development Goals (“OWG”); and 4) the ease of measurement and 
implementation of proposed indicators.  If incorporated into the new agenda, a rule of law 
goal will likely include indicators that are easily evaluated and generate little political 
friction, such as legal identity. 
I. THE NEW DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: IS RULE OF LAW IN VOGUE? 
If there is a catwalk where states can be said to display their taste in 
development philosophy and objectives, then it would be in the formulation 
of the post-2015 Development Agenda (the so-called Sustainable 
Development Goals, or “SDGs”) set to replace the current Millennium 
Development Goals (“MDGs”).  It is expected that these goals, just like the 
MDGs, will influence a range of developmental and other international and 
national policy initiatives by highlighting what is internationally agreed to 
be important and steering resources to those areas.
1
 
                                                     
†
 Professor of Law at Umeå University, Sweden.  
†
 J.D. candidate at the University of Washington School of Law.  
1
 In September 2000, the member states of the United Nations unanimously adopted the Millennium 
Declaration.  The eight Millennium Development Goals are the most important part of the roadmap for 
implementing the Declaration.  The Goals are: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal 
primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve 
maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, and 
develop a global partnership for development.  United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, 
U.N. Doc. A/55/L.2 (Sep. 18, 2000).  
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One of the most discussed and controversial elements of the new 
agenda is the rule of law.  While the original MDGs did include 
commitments on security, human rights, good governance, and the rule of 
law,
2
 they did not stipulate specific objectives for these topics.  At that time, 
goals on governance and the rule of law were deemed too politically 
challenging to implement and too difficult to measure.  However, they have 
surfaced again in the process of formulating the SDGs, resting on essentially 
the same intellectual conviction of their necessity and bolstered further by 
evidence that the MDGs were hampered by the absence of rule of law and 
governance-related goals.
3
  The emerging number of groups and institutions 
supporting promotion, measurement, and evaluation of rule of law efforts 
may also have had a role in securing a place for the rule of law in the 
discussion.
4
 
However, there are no guarantees that governance and rule of law will 
be included in the post-2015 Development Agenda.  Many topics and goals 
compete for attention,
5
 and some states actively oppose any goal with a 
bearing on governance, including the rule of law.
6
  Clearly there are sensitive 
political issues to manage, particularly those related to sovereignty, 
distribution of resources, democracy, and human rights.
7
  Proponents also 
face challenges with formulating an acceptable definition of the rule of law,
8
 
establishing causal evidence for its effectiveness,
9
 and measuring its 
progress and failure.
10
  
                                                     
2
 The Millennium Declaration states: “We will spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen 
the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.” Id. at ¶ 6. 
3
 U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, THE PATH TO ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A 
SYNTHESIS OF EVIDENCE FROM AROUND THE WORLD 59 (June 2010).  
4
 INT’L DEV. LAW ORG., LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE GLOBAL REPORT 2010, 
4-11 (2010). 
5
 See U.N. Secretary-General, Initial Input to the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development 
Goals, ¶¶ 13-14, U.N. Doc. A/67/634 (Dec. 17, 2012). 
6
 See infra Part III.C-E.  
7
 COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR, UNDP, MAKING THE LAW WORK FOR 
EVERYONE 80 (2008); David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and Development Common 
Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 95, 143, 162, 168 (David 
M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); Rosie Wagner, The Rule of Law and the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda 11-12 (Mar. 26, 2013) (unpublished paper prepared for U.N. Development Programme Rule of 
Law Team), available at https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2807279.pdf [hereinafter 
Wagner]. 
8
 See, e.g., RACHEL KLEINFELD, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE 
RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).   
9
 See generally MARCUS COX, SECURITY AND JUSTICE: MEASURING THE DEVELOPMENT RETURNS – 
A REVIEW OF KNOWLEDGE (2008). 
10
 See generally Tom Ginsburg, Pitfalls of Measuring the Rule of Law, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 269 
(2011).  
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This article will not elaborate on these substantive challenges. Instead, 
it will discuss the process of their negotiation and formulation, focusing on 
the various UN-sponsored fora where this process occurs, how states and 
other key actors have framed their preferences, states’ arguments for or 
against various options, and identify the main states in supporting each 
option.  This article also includes an element of prognosis or speculation on 
what will eventually be decided with regard to the main options at hand.  It 
will refrain, however, from an in-depth scholarly inquiry.  The observations 
in this article are drawn from the personal recollection and reflection of one 
of the authors, who was present as an observer and diplomatic representative 
of a UN member state (Sweden) when some of these discussions took place. 
II. INITIAL DESIGNS FOR THE SDGS: A COMMON THREAD 
The different UN groups tasked with drafting recommendations for 
the post-2015 Development Agenda have all concluded that “rule of law” or 
other variations such as “access to justice” and “good governance” are 
instrumental to reaching development goals, if not intrinsically valuable of 
themselves.  The groups charged with drafting these initial reports and 
proposals include the UN System Task Team on the post-2015 UN 
Development Agenda, the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons advising the 
UN Secretary General on the post-2015 Agenda, and the Open Working 
Group (OWG) on Sustainable Development Goals of the UN General 
Assembly.  The following section highlights how each group has framed the 
rule of law in various reports and proposals. 
The initial stages of drafting the SDGs began in earnest with the work 
of the UN System Task Team on the post-2015 UN Development Agenda.  
The Team consisted of over fifty experts from more than fifty UN entities 
and other international organizations along with linkages to academia, the 
media, private sector, and civil society.
11
  In its 2012 report to the Secretary-
General, the Team identified the rule of law as one of many factors that 
could be an “enabler” for reaching various development goals.
12
 
The High Level Panel of Eminent Persons advising the UN Secretary 
General on the post-2015 Development Agenda reached a similar 
conclusion.
13
  The Panel’s May 2013 final report suggested that responsive 
                                                     
11
 U.N. System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, Realizing the Future We 
Want for All: Rep. to the Secretary-General, 44 (June 2012). 
12
 Id. at 24. 
13
 The High Level Panel is co-chaired by David Cameron of the United Kingdom, Susilo Bambang 
Yudyohono of Indonesia, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia, and comprises twenty-four additional 
experts from around the world who were appointed by the Secretary General in July 2013.  The High Level 
438 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 24 NO. 3 
 
   
 
institutions promoting rule of law and access to justice are necessary for 
transformative shifts enabling development, to build effective, open and 
accountable institutions for all.
14
  But it also went further than the Task Team 
by noting that institutions that are able to uphold the rule of law and deliver 
access to justice are necessary not only as drivers of development but have 
intrinsic value in themselves.
15
   
The Panel thus proposed two specific goals: to “[e]nsure good 
governance and effective institutions” (Goal 10)
16
 and to “[e]nsure stable 
and peaceful societies” (Goal 11).
17
 Goal 10 includes targets aimed at 
reducing inequality. The targets related to rule of law include: a) providing 
free and universal legal identity, including birth registration, d) guaranteeing 
the public’s right to information and access to government data; and e) 
reducing bribery and corruption and ensure officials can be held accountable 
e).
18
 Goal 11 includes safety-related targets, with those related to the rule of 
law including: a) reducing violent deaths per 100,000 by x and eliminating 
all forms of violence against children, b) ensuring justice institutions are 
accessible, independent, well-resourced and respect due-process rights, c) 
stemming the external stressors that lead to conflict, including those related 
to organised crime, and d) enhancing the capacity, professionalism and 
accountability of the security forces, police and judiciary.
19
 
The High Level Panel also suggested that a number of justice- and 
security-related targets should be cross-applied to several other goals.  For 
example, these targets overlap with implementation of Goal 1, which aims to 
end poverty by increasing the share of women and men, communities, and 
businesses with secure rights to land, property, and other assets.
20
  The 
targets also intersect with Goal 2, directed at empowering girls and women 
and achieving gender equality by preventing and eliminating all forms of 
violence against girls and women as well as by ensuring the equal rights of 
women to own and inherit property, sign a contract, register a business and 
open a bank account.
21
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, A New Global Partnership: Eradicate 
Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development, 66 (May 30, 2013) [hereinafter The 
High-Level Panel Report]. 
14
 Id. at 4. 
15
 Id. (“The rule of law, freedom of speech and the media, open political choice and active citizen 
participation, access to justice, non-discriminatory and accountable governments and public institutions 
help drive development and have their own intrinsic value.”). 
16
 Id. at 50. 
17
 Id. at 52.  
18
 See supra text accompanying note 15.  
19
 Id. at 52.  
20
 Id. at 33. 
21
 Id. at 34. 
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Parallel to the work of the High Level Panel, the General Assembly’s 
thirty-member Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals 
(“OWG”) launched a process to develop a set of sustainable development 
goals as part of the 2012 Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development.
22
  The OWG noted that the Rio conference had concluded that 
“democracy, good governance and the rule of law, at the national and 
international levels, as well as an enabling environment are essential for 
sustainable development.”
23
  Pursuant to this conclusion, the OWG proposed 
a thematic sub-category for the SDGs on good governance, rule of law, 
peace, and security.
24
 
The conclusions of some of these UN-sponsored processes were 
consolidated in the Secretary-General’s December 2014 Synthesis Report to 
the General Assembly.  The report was positively received by most member 
states and suggests that “justice” (understood as encompassing safe and 
peaceful societies as well as strong institutions) should be an “essential 
element” of the new agenda.
25
  The General Assembly has also held that the 
document is to be understood as a conceptual guide for the remainder of the 
formulation process.
26
 
The following parts will discuss how these different processes came to 
similar conclusions and proposals related to the rule of law and the potential 
course of their advancement in discussions and negotiations to come. 
III. THE TERMS AND SCOPE OF CONTEST: ALLIANCES, FRAMEWORKS, 
DEFINITIONS, AND MEASUREMENTS 
Despite the agreement across proposals recommending rule of law as 
a target, consensus has yet to be reached on the substance and 
implementation of such a target.  Much remains contested.  The major 
debates include whether rule of law goals should attach at the level of 
national or international law, the nature of the relationship between 
governance and the rule of law, as well as disputes over the appropriate 
definition and measurement of rule of law. 
                                                     
22
 G.A. Res. 66/288, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/288 (July 27, 2012) (the General Assembly resolution 
establishing the Open Working Group). 
23
 Id. at ¶ 10. 
24
 Rep. of the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals, 
68th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/68/970 (Aug. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Open Working Group Report]. 
25
 U.N. Secretary-General, The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives 
and Protecting the Planet Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General on the Post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Agenda, ¶¶ 77-79, U.N. Doc. A/69/700 (Dec. 4, 2014) [hereinafter The Road to Dignity by 
2030]. 
26
 G.A. Res. 68/6, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/6 (Oct. 9, 2013).  
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A. Formal and Informal Channels for Discussion and Negotiation 
Member states work through a variety of formal and informal 
channels promote shared perspectives on the new development agenda.  The 
problems and considerations raised in discussions are of the kind commonly 
associated with reaching multilateral agreements in the UN.  That is, the 
conditions and preferences of member states often differ along political, 
economic, and other lines.  These differences are manifest in how states 
view the conclusions of the High Level Panel, the OWG, and other 
processes on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. 
There are of course a number of formally-established practices and 
modalities for guiding the exchange of views, reconciling differences, and 
coming to critical consensus.  Among these include the custom of 
establishing internal consensus within each geographical group prior to 
actual General Assembly debates.  Member states often try to prepare 
positions in the five geographical groups—the African States; Asia and 
Oceania; Eastern Europe (“EEG”); Latin America and the Caribbean 
(“GRULAC”); and Western Europe and Others (“WEOG”).
27
  Other groups 
also hold preliminary negotiations, including the members of the G77 and 
China group and the Non-Aligned Movement (“NAM”).
28
 
These preliminary negotiations allow for more states to be represented 
on the Open Working Group than there are seats available.  The General 
Assembly allows the thirty seats of the OWG to be appointed by the five 
regional groups.  Each seat is shared between two or three states, thus 
ensuring that many more states (around seventy) have a say in the 
negotiations.
29
 
Member states also participate in informal practices and 
collaborations that also influence the discussion and consensus over the rule 
of law in relation to the new development agenda.  Often, member states or 
their respective groups will meet face-to-face and show their cards for the 
first time at “informals,” which refers to the informal intergovernmental 
meetings on a specific theme in the UN building.
 30
  All interested member 
states will participate, and the chair of a particular geographic group will 
                                                     
27
 MARTIN DANIEL NIEMITZ, REFORMING UN DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES: PROMOTING A 
DELIBERATIVE SYSTEM FOR GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY 134 (2015). 
28
 Adil Najam, The Collective South in Multinational Environmental Politics, in POLICYMAKING AND 
PROSPERITY: A MULTINATIONAL ANTHOLOGY 197, 208, 215 (Stuart S. Nagel ed., 2003). 
29
 Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, OPEN WORKING GROUP ON SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1549 (last visited May 31, 
2015). 
30
 Courtney B. Smith, Informal Governance at the United Nations, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 
ON INFORMAL GOVERNANCE 236, 239 (Thomas Christiansen & Christine Neuhold eds., 2012). 
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speak on behalf of its group members.
31
  Statements made in such informals 
indicate which proposals may gain the support of the majority in later actual 
General Assembly debates and become resolutions, declarations, and other 
committing instruments.
32
 
Of particular relevance to this article is an informal group called the 
Group of Friends of the Rule of Law.  The group is committed to the view 
that: 
[I]nternational law and the rule of law are the foundations of the 
international system and that it is therefore imperative to 
strengthen the rule of law in all its dimensions, i.e., at the 
national, international, and institutional levels.
33
 
Currently chaired by Austria, the group is comprised of member states 
of varying regions, political perspectives, and stages of development.  
Member states collaborate on promoting the rule of law among a range of 
UN processes with a particular emphasis on the development goals.  The 
group provides a forum for the Permanent Representatives of these member 
states to meet in their personal capacity in developing guidance for the new 
development agenda. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL OR NATIONAL RULE OF LAW? 
The dispute over whether the rule of law is most relevant at the 
international or national level remains one of the major points of contention 
in the SDG discussions.  This discussion is a continuation of the 
longstanding international versus national debate that profoundly influenced 
the negotiation and adoption of the 2012 Declaration of the High-Level 
Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and 
International Levels.
34
  As its title indicates, the declaration concluded that 
the concept had equal relevance on both levels.  This conclusion was the 
result of a rough compromise between member states whose positions 
remain grouped along a spectrum.  Although it is far from a settled contest in 
all forums, the prevailing view within the OWG has largely turned out to be 
that of emphasizing applicability of the rule of law at the national level. 
                                                     
31
 Id. 
32
 Id. 
33
 Konrad G. Buhler, The Australian Rule of Law Initiative 2004-2008—The Panel Series, the 
Advisory Group and the Final Report on the UN Security Council and the Rule of Law, 12 MAX PLANCK 
Y.B. OF U.N. LAW 409, 413 (2008). 
34
 Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the 
National and International Levels, G.A. Res. 67/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/1 (Nov. 30, 2012) [hereinafter 
Declaration of the High-Level Meeting]. 
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At one end of the spectrum, those generally identified as the “West” 
focus on the rule of law as a principle of governance and as such relevant 
everywhere, including at the national level.  This means, for example, that 
rule of law encompasses national compliance with human rights norms and 
the ability to bring a range of civil and economic matters before national 
courts.  At the other end of the spectrum is the Non-Aligned Movement 
(“NAM”).  Chaired by Iran, the NAM emphasizes national sovereignty and 
sees the rule of law as a concept solely or at least primarily applicable at the 
international level.  This interpretation is accordingly concerned with issues 
such as Security Council reform and the status of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories in the Middle East. 
The clash between these views was apparent at the recent Eighth 
OWG session.
35
  Representing the views of the “West,” Austria spoke on 
behalf of the Group of Friends of the Rule of Law in reiterating the message 
of the Declaration and argued that rule of law and development are always 
strongly interrelated.
36
  The WEOG members and organizations affiliated 
with the members of that group also advocated for a “national” level focus.
37
  
The Netherlands similarly stressed that the rule of law is at the heart of the 
social contract in every country.
38
  The Netherlands specifically mentioned 
legal identity as the first step to accessing public services and to economic 
and political processes.
39
  The European Union also argued for concrete and 
measurable commitments on the rule of law at the national level in the new 
framework.
40
 
However, the supporters of the national view were not exclusively 
Northern, Western, or part of the WEOG.  In the same session, a number of 
states from the “South” also expressed support for the rule of law at the 
national level.  For example, Mexico and Peru argued that the rule of law is 
a sine qua non for sustainable development and applies equally to all 
                                                     
35
 See Martin Sajdik, Remarks on Behalf of Members of the Group of Friends of the Rule of Law at 
the Eighth Session of the General Assembly Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (Feb. 
3-7, 2014), available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/6565austria.pdf 
[hereinafter Group of Friends OWG Statement].  
36
 Id. 
37
 See Australia, Netherlands, UK Troika Statement at the Eighth Session of the General Assembly 
Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (Feb. 3-7, 2014), 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=255&nr=6370&menu=35 (last visited 
June 7, 2015). 
38
 Id.  
39
 Id. 
40
 See Ioannis Vrailas, Statement on Behalf of the European Union and its Member States at the 
Eighth Session of the General Assembly Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (Feb. 3-
7, 2014), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=255&nr=6445&menu=35 
(last visited June 7, 2015).  
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nations. States like Pakistan were more cautiously supportive, stating that 
rule of law is more relevant to the OWG than the typically international 
topics of conflict prevention and post-conflict building.
41
  Egypt has also 
indicated support, albeit with even greater wariness.  It has discussed the 
need to maintain a balance in developing the national and international 
dimensions of the rule of law while nonetheless stressing that it is the 
international level of rule of law which needs more attention.
42
  Egypt 
understands application at the international level to mean compliance with 
public international law, particularly in the Middle East conflict.
43
 
Meanwhile, the NAM represented the opposite view, stating after the 
2012 General Assembly Declaration on the Rule of Law that no new 
conditions should be stipulated for member states at that time.
44
  The group 
also highlighted the need to respect national sovereignty, undertake Security 
Council reforms, and to focus on current issues in the Middle East, 
particularly the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
45
  The group further argued 
that rule of law should be pursued in a way that is respectful of the diversity 
of legal, political, and economic systems, and therefore opposed over-
prescriptive targets, calling for respect for national circumstances.
46
  NAM 
furthermore expressed particular concern about unilateral and extra-
territorial measures, arguing that no state or group of states has the authority 
to deprive other states of their legal rights for political considerations.
47
  
Russia’s position was equally negative, stating outright that rule of law as a 
goal would not be in line with the Rio+20 objectives and outcomes. 
As far as the OWG is concerned, advocates of applying rule of law 
targets at both the international and national levels prevailed.  This was in 
large part because of the normative support they were able to invoke from 
the 2012 UNGA Declaration.
48
  In its August 2014 final report to the 
                                                     
41
 See Masood Khan, Statement on Behalf of the Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka at the Eighth Session 
of the General Assembly Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (Feb. 3-7, 2014), 
available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=255&nr=6315&menu=35 
(last visited June 7, 2015) [hereinafter Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka OWG Statement]. 
42
 See Mohamed Khalil, Statement on Behalf of Egypt at the Eighth Session of the General 
Assembly Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (Feb. 3-7, 2014) 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=255&nr=6425&menu=35 (last visited 
June 7, 2015). 
43
 Id. 
44
 See Gholamhossein Dehghani, Statement on Behalf of Non-Aligned Movement in the Eighth 
Session of the General Assembly Open Working Group on Sustainable Developments Goals (Feb. 3-7, 
2014), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/6360iran1.pdf (last visited June 7, 2015) 
[hereinafter NAM OWG Statement]. 
45
 See id. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. 
48
 Declaration of the High-Level Meeting, supra note 34. 
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General Assembly, the OWG accordingly included the following in Goal 16: 
to “[p]romote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, 
provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and 
inclusive institutions at all levels.”
49
 
V. GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 
The relationship between the rule of law and governance has been 
another recurrent and controversial topic, with proponents and critics 
divided along roughly the same camps as those contesting whether rule of 
law should be relevant to national policy.  Similarly, national sovereignty is 
a concern for many, particularly for recipients of foreign and international 
aid.  However, given the clear endorsement of governance in the Secretary 
General’s synthesis report on the new development goals, it seems that there 
is some consensus on including governance within the new development 
agenda. 
The “governance” or “good governance” doctrine has its roots in a 
group of theories often referred to as the “Washington Consensus.”
50
  These 
theories suggest that economic development and poverty reduction are most 
likely to result from policies that reduce the role of the state, break up the 
dominance of corrupt political elites, and encourage private enterprise and 
foreign investment.
51
  Policy makers have now also concluded that 
prescriptions for global governance should not stop at shrinking the state and 
liberalizing the economy, but should include initiatives to strengthen and 
open up the institutions that protect and enforce important rights and 
freedoms.
52
  The current definition of governance accordingly calls for more 
than just a smaller and more effective state.  It now includes support for 
establishing or consolidating key aspects of the rule of law, which 
encompasses at least the core human rights.
53
 
Unsurprisingly, those states most sceptical about the governance 
doctrine are also those that have shared the greatest doubts about including 
the rule of law within the SDG agenda or sought to create a specific SDG-
understanding of the concept.  Pakistan, for example, has argued in the 
OWG that that the rule of law has to be conceived of in the broader context 
                                                     
49
 Open Working Group Report, supra note 24, at 20. 
50
 Joseph Stiglitz, The Future of Global Governance, in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 
RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 309, 313 (Narcis Serra et al. eds., 2008). 
51
 Id. at 315. 
52
 Id. 
53
 See generally ANNE METTE KJAER, GOVERNANCE 173 (2004); Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law 
and Development: Second Generation of Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. OF INT’L 
LAW 199 (2004). 
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of good governance and the right to development.  In keeping with its 
position on the applicability of rule of law solely at the international level, 
Pakistan has also argued that the OWG must address institutional deficits in 
global governance and that rule of law must not be used to impose 
conditions upon member states.
54
  Rather, Pakistan has stressed the 
importance of national ownership and a bottom-up approach.
55
 
The members of the NAM group have taken a still more extreme 
position.  NAM has criticized many aspects of governance and the rule of 
law as attempts to infringe on national sovereignty.
56
  For similar reasons, 
developing countries are wary of attaching rule of law conditions to foreign 
aid.  If rule of law reforms are included as “conditionalities” for eligibility 
for structural and large-scale support, developing countries argue that 
discretion over a wide range of formerly purely domestic issues would be 
beholden to a host of foreign or international actors.
57
 
The positions of both donor and recipient states have merit.  When the 
“West” argues for the inclusion of rule of law in the development agenda, it 
does so with some empirical evidence and normative support.
58
  However, 
the recipients are right in pointing out that donors then also assert their right 
to weigh in on a much wider range of domestic political matters. 
This dichotomy between aid donors and recipients is likely to 
continue influencing the SDG negotiation.  At the same time, the Secretary 
General’s indicative synthesis report, “The Road to Dignity by 2030,” gives 
effective governance prominent placement at the start of its description of 
what “Justice” entails.
59
  It would therefore seem that many developing 
countries already seem to have accepted that governance will be part of the 
new development agenda. 
VI. DEFINITIONAL DEBATES 
The eternal question of what the rule of law actually is, and what 
political objectives it serves, casts its shadow over the SDG process in 
various ways.  Some definitional latitude is only to be expected, as the rule 
of law is an inherently difficult concept.  Some generality can also be 
positive, as the principles must always be adapted to national conditions.  
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But there are also those who seek to exaggerate and exploit this conceptual 
uncertainty in order to exclude rule of law from the development agenda.  
Russia, for example, has on several occasions argued that the concept cannot 
be included because it lacks sufficient clarity with regard to its relationship 
to development and promotion, among other concerns.
60
  Egypt and other 
countries have argued that more work needs to be done by the General 
Assembly to elaborate a common understanding of rule of law, including its 
parameters and elements, and that it is therefore premature to mainstream 
the notion of rule of law in the context of the SDGs.
61
 
To be sure, there is limited normative guidance for the rule of law in 
international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”), and similar documents.
62
  Institutional definitions also vary, as 
different UN agencies choose different interpretations depending on their 
mandates, priorities, and the challenges at hand. 
On the other hand, the UN Secretary General has clearly enunciated 
that the rule of law is a principle of governance in its strategic report, “The 
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies,” stating that: 
[The rule of law] . . . refers to a principle of governance in which all 
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the 
State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated and which are 
consistent with international human rights norms and standards.  It 
requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to principles of 
supremacy of law, equality before the law, fairness in the application 
of law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal 
certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal 
transparency.
63
 
This report also appears to have been an important building block for 
the 2012 UNGA Rule of Law Declaration, which has been even more 
important in framing the rule of law within the SDG discussion.  This 
unanimously adopted instrument confirms three very important points of 
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departure.  First, it states that concept of rule of law is relevant on the 
international and national level.
64
  Second, it asserts a mutually-reinforcing 
relationship between the rule of law, human rights, and democracy.
65
  Third, 
it holds that the rule of law should be regarded a principle of governance.
66
  
It also provides a concrete platform for discussing the rule of law in the SDG 
process by recommending consideration of the relationship between the rule 
of law and development in the post-2015 international development 
agenda.
67
 
Also, although the Secretary General’s 2014 synthesis report does not 
attempt a definition, it explains how the Secretary General perceives the rule 
of law as an “essential element” of justice.  For example, the report mentions 
that laws and institutions must protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.
68
  It also mentions that access to fair justice systems, accountable 
institutions of democratic governance are integral to sustainable 
development.
69
 
Incidentally, there is also a slow process of political consensus-
building going on independently of the SDG discussion.  Several 
organizations and agencies have independently produced policy documents 
with similar statements and goals regarding the rule of law.  For example, 
the World Bank says that it aims to supplant autocratic and state-centred 
systems with rule of law that operates objectively, is accessible, reasonably 
efficient, transparent, predictable, enforceable, and protects human rights 
and legitimate state interests, among other goals.
70
  However, it seems that 
these discussions and ensuing understandings have made little impression on 
the OWG. 
Ultimately, it is the documents put forth by the General Assembly and 
the Secretary General that seem to have disarmed most of the definitional 
sensitivities around the rule of law as a concept among key stakeholder 
countries for now.  However, the definitions remain skeletal, making it likely 
that the issue will resurface when goals have actually been decided and the 
technical aspects of measurement elaborated, as will be discussed below. 
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VII. MEASUREMENT: NOT JUST MATH 
Although the inherent difficulties in quantifying the essentially 
qualitative concept of the rule of law are obvious, and Russia and some 
countries have been quick to invoke those difficulties for excluding the rule 
of law from the development agenda, there is more and more evidence from 
domestic state initiatives and international NGO efforts that the rule of law 
can actually be measured in some meaningful respects.
71
  Many states 
already systematically and regularly measure aspects of the rule of law to 
justify policies and budget allocations, or to demonstrate to citizens that 
statutory responsibilities are taken seriously.
72
  The implementation of the 
Millennium Development Goals has also brought about new and 
concentrated efforts to strengthen statistical data collection in many 
countries and sectors such as maternal mortality rates.
73
  Those efforts are 
likely to intensify should the rule of law be included in the new development 
agenda. 
A number of international actors, among them the EU and the UN, are 
also collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistics on a range of national 
rule of law matters, including, for example, homicide rates.
74
  Furthermore, 
the Rio+20 outcome document,
75
 the so-called Elements Paper of January 
2014,
76
 and other policy documents provide ideas and parameters to guide 
states and other actors in formulating goals, targets, and indicators.  Such 
guidance includes, for example, suggestions that indicators should be limited 
in number, universal in application, measurable, easy to communicate, and 
adaptable to country conditions. 
There are informal or non-state initiatives to the same end.  Since 
2010, the independent organisation World Justice Project has issued its Rule 
of Law Index.
77
  In this perception-based index, citizens and experts give 
their own country score points in a range of rule of law-related areas.
78
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These areas include constraints on government powers, absence of 
corruption, order and security, fundamental rights, open government, 
regulatory enforcement, civil justice, criminal justice, and informal justice.
79
  
When added together, the resulting scores provide a measure of each 
country’s adherence to rule of law in each respective area.
80
 
VIII. POSSIBLE GOALS AND INDICATORS FOR RULE OF LAW 
The many unresolved issues regarding inclusion of rule of law in the 
new development agenda notwithstanding, various concrete options for rule 
of law goals and indicators have been discussed within and among states, 
international organizations, civil society, and interest groups for several 
years.  The most frequently discussed among these options are legal identity, 
personal security, access to justice, and land rights.
81
  Technically, it seems 
that the High Level Panel report, the OWG report and the Secretary 
General’s synthesis report could accommodate any or all of them.  The 
following section provides a brief synopsis of these options as well as the 
political, legal, technical, and other factors influencing the likelihood of 
implementation. 
A. Legal Identity 
Of the four main options, legal identity is the most likely to be 
implemented as a rule of law target or measurement.  Although there is not a 
generally-accepted definition of the concept, the term is often understood as 
the status of a person before state authorities.
82
  Member states generally 
support adoption of legal identity as a measurement because most states 
already seek to provide legal identity to citizens or even non-citizens.  State 
motivations for providing legal identity range from governance and planning 
purposes to state acknowledgment that legal identity is essential for 
accessing various human rights and other rights entitlements such as voting, 
access services, and utilities.
83
 
The practical aspect of ensuring and measuring legal identity is 
closely related to civil registration, which is defined in a UN handbook: 
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The United Nations defines civil registration as the continuous, 
permanent, compulsory and universal recording of the 
occurrence and characteristics of vital events pertaining to the 
population as provided through decree or regulation in 
accordance with the legal requirements of each country.  Civil 
registration is carried out primarily for the purpose of 
establishing the legal documents provided for by law.
84
 
These registration documents themselves may not comprise the legal 
identity as such, but rather be considered as evidence of the actual status of 
the person.  At the same time, claiming legal identity without documentation 
might be problematic or next to impossible.  The institutional mechanism for 
providing legal identity is thus normally a civil registration system that both 
maintains records and provides registration documents to people.
85
  Among 
these documents, birth registration is generally considered a good indicator 
of legal identity.
86
  Birth registration is furthermore a fundamental human 
right. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and later UN resolutions call upon states to 
provide simple, accessible, and effective registration procedures to allow 
individuals to realize this right.
87
  Regional instruments provide for similar 
rights.
88
 
Arguments for the inclusion of legal identity in the SDG process are 
buttressed by the general perception that lack of legal identity is a critical 
problem.  The World Bank estimates that 50 million births went unrecorded 
in 2009 and that seven in ten children in the world’s least-developed 
countries do not have birth certificates or any other registration documents.
89
  
Birth registration also enjoys donor support from organizations including the 
World Bank and the Open Society Foundation.
90
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Legal identity is further acceptable because it is already a familiar 
concept within the development agenda context.  At least six of the 
Millennium Development Goals rely on the registration of births and 
deaths.
91
  Since the MDGs were established, the prominence of legal identity 
has only increased.  The OWG proposal includes legal identity under Goal 
16, which calls on states to “[p]romote peaceful and inclusive societies for 
sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, 
accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.”
92
  Under this goal, target 
nine specifically provides for legal identity, requiring states to: “by 2030, 
provide legal identity for all, including birth registration”.
93
  The report of 
the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the post-2015 Development 
Agenda also mentions legal identity under Goal 10a to “provide free and 
universal legal identity, such as birth registrations.”
94
 
Measuring the breadth and nature of legal identity provision is also 
simplified because virtually all states already have institutions more or less 
capable of registering births and issuing birth certificates.  General data on 
births in individual countries is also collected by the UN Statistics 
Division.
95
  The number of such registrations is sensitive to policy changes, 
so any improvement would be notable.
96
 
Legal identity still faces some challenges before it may be included as 
part of a rule of law development goal.  These challenges range from 
providing evidence of its individual and state benefits to addressing potential 
negative impacts in certain contexts. 
For example, there is a need for academic studies demonstrating a 
causal relationship between registration and individual empowerment or 
national planning.
97
  The impact of development goals is also dependent on 
the context—for example, weak institutions and widespread corruption limit 
the concrete value of legal identity.
98
 
There has been some discussion in the UN and among member states 
over whether including birth registrations as an indicator might give rise to 
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negative consequences.  For example, promoting birth registrations might in 
turn encourage states to make access to services contingent on possession of 
a certificate.
99
  States may also use registration as a means of identifying and 
infringing on the rights or security of particular groups.
100
  Some new 
development agenda discussions have noted these concerns, and the 
suggested policy implication is that birth registration should be free and 
available to everyone, but not mandatory.  Another suggestion is that 
information on the birth certificates should comprise only the date, place of 
birth, and sex.  The UN already stresses the need for confidentiality with 
regard to public records, both because it guarantees the privacy of 
individuals and because it encourages people to actually register.
101
 
The legal identity option thus seems to be most likely to be accepted 
as an indicator due to its wide political acceptance and technical feasibility.  
Although it is difficult to account for its absence from the “Justice” section 
of the Secretary General’s synthesis report,
102
 its place in the new 
development agenda seems otherwise solid.  In other important documents, 
it is explicitly mentioned and discussed, for example as a target under Goal 
10 in the report of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons.
103
 
IX. PERSONAL SECURITY 
Personal security also has the potential to be acceptable to many 
member states and other stakeholders: it is a fundamental state function, a 
human right,
104
 and a basic precondition for almost all aspects of dignified 
human life.
105
  It is also well known that interpersonal violence prevents or 
hampers many aspects of economic development.
106
  It is widely 
acknowledged to deter investors, erode trust and social cohesion, consume 
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state resources, and challenge proper governance structures.
107
  However, 
disagreement over its definition and fear of negative human rights impacts 
make personal security an uncertain candidate for a rule of law indicator. 
As with legal identity, there is no universal definition of personal 
security and reporting standards vary between countries.  Some key aspects 
of personal security are nonetheless obvious and measurable through 
statistics such as homicide and assault rates and public perception of 
security.
108
  Comparable data is usually either domestically or internationally 
available.
109
  These indicators also tend to be sensitive to change over time, 
albeit slowly, given the time needed for law enforcement and judicial 
processes to undergo reform.
110
 
The challenges to establishing personal security as an indicator for 
rule of law are largely attributable to state political attitudes.  Many states 
regard all matters related to security as exclusively domestic and as such 
absolutely outside of the realm of international scrutiny.  Discussion of 
actions to improve personal security will almost inevitably touch on the 
relationship between the state and the individual or the way the state is 
organized and operates.
111
  Several states still do not respond to UN surveys 
on crime trends or the operation of criminal justice systems despite having 
the data readily available.
112
  Besides withholding data due to opposing 
political perspectives, these countries may also be wary of putting off 
investors or tourists, or other image-related concerns. 
There are also concerns about the deleterious effects of using personal 
security as an indicator.  Enhancing security can mean increased repression 
and negative impacts on human rights or, indeed, essential elements of the 
rule of law.
113
  Crime rate indicators may therefore need to be counter-
balanced by indicators for police professionalism and respect for human 
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rights in order to discourage coercive approaches to policing and other forms 
of excessive government authority.
114
 
Whether states with disparate views on what personal security entails 
will be able to come to a consensus on a set of indicators remains uncertain. 
The likelihood of personal security serving as an indicator for rule of law is 
further hindered by scepticism from donor agencies, influential civil society 
actors, and other important facilitators of change.  Many are already doubtful 
of initiatives related to security (aside from Security Sector Reform) for fear 
of empowering or lending legitimacy to branches of the state authority that 
are already problematic. 
X. ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
Access to justice was identified as a potential goal early on in the 
SDG process.  It has been a popular topic in the UN and among influential 
international and aid organizations for some time.  The concept is seen as not 
merely an inherent good, but also as instrumental to various aspects of 
development and the protection of human rights.
115
  Many developing 
countries—often with the support of development agencies—have sought to 
develop various mechanisms that facilitate access to justice.
116
  
However, definitional problems and a lack of readily available 
reporting mechanisms have abated support for inclusion of access to justice 
as a development goal.  As with the other potential indicators, it is difficult 
to define “justice” and “access.”
117
  In the absence of the domestic reporting 
mechanisms, the international alternatives for reporting are limited and 
inadequate.
118
  Needs and challenges related to access to justice vary 
tremendously between countries and sectors, presenting a further challenge 
to the formulation of a goal with relevant and comparable indicators.
119
 
Even the main proponents now seem to have tacitly acknowledged the 
difficulties involved.  Although access to justice is still mentioned in the 
SDG context in, for example, the Secretary General’s synthesis report,
120
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fewer and fewer member states seriously argue for it as an attainable, stand-
alone goal supported by measurable indicators. 
XI. LAND RIGHTS 
The early interest in including land rights in the new development 
agenda was inspired by the body of empirical evidence that land rights are 
important for promoting stability and development.
121
  Indeed, there are 
some references in new development agenda documents to ensuring that 
men and women have “control over land”
122
 and that “[w]omen and girls 
must have . . . the right to own land.”
123
  However, the initial enthusiasm has 
been largely overwhelmed by the difficulties presented by political 
opposition from influential countries such as China and the absence of 
certain key elements of support, notably international norms establishing 
clear rights to tenure or ownership of land.  Furthermore, the case for 
including land rights also suffers from an absence of readily available 
mechanisms for measurement and reporting.
124
 
XII. CONCLUSION 
Thus far, the new development agenda discussions and negotiations 
reveal a few key factors influencing whether and how the rule of law will be 
incorporated into the next round of development goals.  Among these factors 
are 1) the compelling force of traditional political views and allegiances in 
determining member states’ positions in the debate, 2) the continued 
importance of the UNGA Rule of Law Declaration, 3) the centrality of the 
OWG, and 4) the ease of measurement and implementation of proposed 
indicators. 
In posing arguments and forming alliances on the rule of law issue, 
member states have largely based their positions on political and historical 
predispositions rather than lessons learnt from implementing the current 
MDGs or empirical evidence.  This means that states generally fall into 
fairly predictable regional and political camps—“western,” developed, aid-
donating countries advocating rule of law definitions and indicators that 
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reach national law and domestic governance, while “southern,” developing, 
aid-recipient countries emphasize rule of law principles at the international 
level that give great deference to national sovereignty.  Such reflexive 
debate has made it extremely difficult to reach consensus or final 
conclusions, and the disparity of views on politics and development 
philosophy will continue to shape further discussions.  Documents such as 
the 2012 United Nations General Assembly Rule of Law Declaration and 
conclusions such as those issued by the OWG and the United Nations 
Secretary General are therefore critical for establishing frameworks to move 
discussion forward. 
The unanimously adopted 2012 UNGA Rule of Law Declaration has 
provided a particularly important normative platform for discussion and 
continues to frame the ongoing debate.  It is true that there were rule of law 
dimensions in the MDGs and that a rule of law goal has enjoyed widespread 
support from several influential state and non-state actors, but it would 
hardly have been possible to pursue inclusion of specific rule of law 
ambitions within the new development agenda if it were not for the 
foundation established by the Declaration.  The Declaration does not just 
stipulate that the rule of law should be included in the new agenda, it also 
provides a framework for how the rule of law should be understood.  
Furthermore, it specifies critical positions on otherwise contested issues, 
stating, for example, that the rule of law is applicable at the level of both 
international and national law and that it is interlinked with human rights 
and democracy. 
Meanwhile, the OWG has become the main forum for producing 
conclusions on options for how a rule of law goal should materialize.  As its 
thirty members represent the views of roughly seventy different member 
states, reaching consensus in the OWG is an extremely cumbersome process.  
The demanding nature of the process is nonetheless vital to lending 
persuasive weight to its development agenda proposals.  The efforts invested 
and the consensus reached have also generated a notion that the OWG 
conclusions now need to be preserved and safeguarded. At the same time, 
the Secretary General’s report has provided a provisional baseline for 
discussions, with the section on “Justice” largely covering most issues 
related to rule of law.  Also, the High-Level Panel has given additional 
political endorsement as well as contributed experience and evidence to 
proposals. 
The technical feasibility of goals and indicators is also important to 
their chances of inclusion within the new development agenda.  The rule of 
law indicators most likely to be adopted are those which, like legal identity, 
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are already widely implemented and easily measured and understood.  Other 
successful indicators will also likely rely on measures that member states 
can carry out with existing infrastructure and are easy to evaluate and 
compare.  These are important reasons for why legal identity enjoys broad 
support across member states. 
